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Economic Well-Being and Poverty among the Elderly: 
An Analysis Based on a Collective Consumption Model
*
 
We apply the collective consumption model of Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006) to 
analyse economic well-being and poverty among the elderly. The model focuses on 
individual preferences, a consumption technology that captures the economies of scale of 
living in a couple, and a sharing rule that governs the intra-household allocation of resources. 
The model is applied to a time series of Dutch consumption expenditure surveys. Our 
empirical results indicate substantial economies of scale and a wife’s share that is increasing 
in total expenditures. We further calculated poverty rates by means of the collective 
consumption model. Collective poverty rates of widows and widowers turn out to be slightly 
lower than traditional ones based on a standard equivalence scale. Poverty among women 
(men) in elderly couples, however, seems to be heavily underestimated (overestimated) by 
the traditional approach. Finally, we analysed the impact of becoming a widow(er). Based on 
cross-sectional evidence, we find that the drop (increase) in material well-being following the 
husband’s death is substantial for women in high (low) expenditure couples. For men, the 
picture is reversed. 
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A major concern in light of an ageing population is poverty among widows and widowers
and, more generally, the economic well-being of the elderly. As Hurd (1990) rightfully
remarks, the issue of poverty is especially troublesome for the elderly since they have
fewer possibilities to recover from a drop in income. Compared with prime age individ-
uals, for example, elderly people face more di¢ culties to (re)enter the labour market.
Moreover, given the fall in income after retirement and a lower life expectancy, it is
more di¢ cult to overcome unexpected negative income shocks. This lack of ways to get
back on track implies that poverty among the elderly tends to be more permanent than
for other groups in society.
Numerous studies analysed poverty among the elderly (see Engelhardt and Gruber,
2004, Weir, Willis and Sevak, 2004, McGarry and Schoeni, 2005, and Zaidi et al., 2006,
for only a few recent examples). Most of these studies make use of income or expenditure
data at the household level to count the number of individuals in poverty. As Deaton
and Paxson (1998) indicate, this transition from households to individuals requires as-
sumptions about the intra-household allocation of resources, about di⁄erences in needs
and about the importance of economies of scale. Most of the analyses of elderly poverty
ignore the issue of the intra-household distribution of resources by assuming that all
individuals in a household are equally well o⁄. The literature on intra-household allo-
cation, though, convincingly demonstrated that resources are not equally shared within
households (see, for example, Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene, 1994,
Lundberg, Pollak and Wales, 1997, and other references in Vermeulen, 2002). Fur-
ther, incomes or expenditures of individuals from di⁄erent households are usually made
comparable to each other by using some equivalence scale (see, for example, Coder,
Rainwater and Smeeding, 1989, Slesnick, 1993, Smeeding and Sullivan, 1998, Johnson
and Smeeding, 2000, Engelhardt and Gruber, 2004, and Zaidi et al., 2006). Traditional
equivalence scales, however, are subject to at least two important criticisms (see Lewbel
and Pendakur, 2006, for a survey). Firstly, data on consumption patterns under dif-
ferent price and income regimes can identify the shape and the ranking of indi⁄erence
curves, but not the utility level attached to each of these curves. Consequently, it is
impossible to determine at which level of income or expenditures households with a dif-
ferent demographic composition are equally well o⁄. Secondly, traditional equivalence
scales are based on the so-called unitary model, which assumes that a household acts
as if it were a single rational decision maker. However, as Browning, Chiappori and
Lewbel (2006) stress, it are individuals who have preferences, and not households. As
a consequence, the unitary assumption in the analysis of consumer behaviour seems
overly restrictive. This argument is supported by the growing empirical evidence that
the standard unitary model indeed does not provide an adequate description of ob-
served multi-person household behaviour (see, for example, Fortin and Lacroix, 1997,
3Browning and Chiappori, 1998, and Cherchye and Vermeulen, 2006).
A growingly popular framework for analysing household behaviour is Chiappori￿ s
(1988, 1992) collective model. Apart from the starting point that a household con-
sists of individuals with own rational preferences, the collective approach uses the mere
assumption that intra-household allocations are Pareto-e¢ cient. Contrary to the uni-
tary model, the collective model entails empirical restrictions that seem more di¢ cult
to reject when tested on multi-person household data (see, again, Fortin and Lacroix,
1997, Browning and Chiappori, 1998, and Cherchye and Vermeulen, 2006). In addition,
the collective model is particularly useful for addressing welfare-related questions that
speci￿cally focus on the within-household distribution of resources (see Chiappori, 1992,
and Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir, 2005). Therefore, the collective model seems an
obvious point of departure to analyse elderly poverty.
In this paper, we analyse economic well-being and poverty among the elderly by
means of Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel￿ s (2006) collective consumption model. They
propose a model that is de￿ned in terms of individual preferences, a consumption tech-
nology that captures the economies of scale of living in a couple and a sharing rule that
governs the intra-household allocation of resources. By combining data from singles
and couples via the assumption that preferences over goods do not change when indi-
viduals form a couple, they are able to completely identify the model and use it as a
basis to calculate economies of scale and so-called indi⁄erence scales.1 Unlike traditional
equivalence scales, these indi⁄erence scales do not require any interpersonal utility com-
parisons. Since they also rest on a structural model that explicitly takes account of
individual preferences, indi⁄erence scales are not subject to the criticisms on traditional
equivalence scales.
We will apply the collective model of Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006) to a
time series of consumption expenditure surveys describing the consumption pattern of
Dutch elderly couples between 1978 and 2004. As already indicated, we also need singles
(whose consumption behaviour can be described by a unitary model) to completely
identify the collective consumption model. Therefore, we will also make use of (elderly)
widows and widowers that are drawn from the same data source. Worthy of note is
that the equal preferences assumption in this context seems less restrictive than when
comparing unmarried singles with individuals in couples.
Due to its particular set-up, the collective consumption model of Browning, Chi-
appori and Lewbel (2006) is able to analyse poverty among the elderly while taking
into account the potentially unequal distribution of resources within elderly couples,
which is completely ignored in traditional poverty analyses. As we will demonstrate,
this analysis yields poverty rates that di⁄er markedly from those obtained by means
of a traditional analysis. We will also have a closer look at the economic consequences
1Other identi￿cation strategies are possible if goods are assignable (quod non in our data).
4of becoming a widow(er), which is an important policy issue (see Holden, Burkhauser
and Feaster, 1988, Weir, Willis and Sevak, 2004, and McGarry and Schoeni, 2005). A
very useful concept in this respect is the above mentioned indi⁄erence scale that allows
comparing the well-being of the same individual in two di⁄erent living arrangements (in
casu as a member of a couple and as a widow(er)). Once again, the collective approach
is able to shed new light on the issue.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the respective
models that will be used to describe the consumption behaviour of elderly couples and
widow(er)s. The empirical speci￿cation, data and estimation results are discussed in
Section 3. Section 4 focuses on the analysis of the economic well-being and poverty
among the elderly by means of the collective consumption model. Section 5 concludes.
2. The model
2.1. Widows and widowers
Let us start with the (standard) consumption model of a single-person household k,
where k = f if the household consists of a widow, while k = m if the single is a wid-
ower. In what follows, we focus on individuals who do not participate to the labour
market (any more). Under the market prices p and total expenditures xk, the in-
dividual purchases the n-vector of goods qk. Preferences are represented by a twice
continuously di⁄erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly quasi-concave direct utility
function uk(qk). A single person k is faced with the following optimization programme:
max
qk uk(qk) subject to p0qk = xk: (2.1)
The maximization problem results in a set of n Marshallian demand equations:
qk = gk(p=xk); (2.2)
which satisfy the well-known properties of adding-up, homogeneity, symmetry and neg-
ative semide￿niteness of the Slutsky matrix. Substituting these demand equations in
the direct utility function obtains the individual￿ s indirect utility function vk(p=xk).
2.2. Elderly couples
We now consider an elderly two-person (f and m) household where both individuals
do not participate to the labour market (any more).2 Contrary to the unitary model
for describing household behaviour, the collective model explicitly recognizes that each
2For simplicity, we will frequently make use of words like ￿marriage￿and ￿spouse￿ , but, of course,
the household members need not necessarily be married.
5of the household members has own rational preferences. In what follows, we will as-
sume that individual utility functions are egoistic, in the sense that they only depend
on the own consumption bundle. Although there is no doubt that this assumption
is more restrictive than when one allows for externalities within the household, it is
less restrictive than Chiappori￿ s (1988) egoistic preferences, since, following Browning,
Chiappori and Lewbel (2006), we will make use of a consumption technology that ac-
counts for economies of scale in the household. These economies of scale entail gains
from marriage, which give individuals a potentially strong economic incentive to form
a couple.
Each individual￿ s preferences are represented by a twice continuously di⁄erentiable,
strictly increasing and strictly quasi-concave direct utility function uk(qk). A core
feature of the collective model is that it explicitly recognizes that a household that
consists of several household members does not necessarily behave as a single decision
maker. In other words, the model that is useful to describe widow(er)s￿consumption
behaviour is no longer useful for couples. Following Chiappori (1988), we will assume
that spouses choose Pareto e¢ cient consumption allocations. Without loss of generality,
this implies that a couple￿ s objective function can be written as a weighted sum of
individual utilities:
￿(p=x;s)uf(qf) + um (qm): (2.3)
The (positive) Pareto weight ￿ represents the female￿ s relative bargaining power and
generally depends on prices p and the couple￿ s total expenditures x. (The use of nor-
malized prices implies that we assume that the Pareto weight is not a⁄ected by the unit
in which monetary variables are expressed). The Pareto weight may further depend
on a vector of so-called distribution factors s. These are de￿ned as variables that do
not directly a⁄ect preferences, nor the budget constraint and consumption technology,
but have an impact on spouses￿bargaining positions (see, for example, Bourguignon,
Browning and Chiappori, 2006). If ￿ is increasing in, say, a distribution factor s, then
the wife￿ s bargaining position improves following an increase in s. This implies that
she will be able to claim a higher utility than before, which is produced by an intra-
household allocation that is more favourable to her. More speci￿cally, this is obtained
by a greater quantity of the wife￿ s consumption qf relative to that of the husband. The
fact that the household￿ s objective function depends on prices and total expenditures,
which implies that Marshallian demand fails to satisfy the usual Slutsky conditions, is
the distinguishing characteristic of the collective model as compared to the traditional
unitary model.
Like Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006), we will explicitly consider economies
of scale of living in a couple. These economies of scale are due to sharing and joint
consumption inside the household. Consequently, aggregate individual consumption
q = qf +qm will typically not add up to the household￿ s purchased consumption bundle
6z. Examples of goods that may have a public nature are rent or heating: consumption
of it by one of the spouses does not reduce the supply available for the other spouse,
while no individual can be excluded from consuming it (at least if one does not want
to break up the marriage). On the other hand, goods like beverages are purely private:
every bottle of coke drunk by one of the members cannot be drunk by the other one.
However, in reality, the distinction is not necessarily that easy. When one of the spouses
spends most of the day outside the house while the other spouse mainly stays inside,
expenditures on heating during the day are private. As the example makes clear, many
goods will have both a private and a public component.3
Following Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006), we assume that a couple is char-
acterized by a consumption technology that transforms the household￿ s purchased quan-
tity vector z into two individual vectors of private good equivalents qf and qm. For
simplicity, we will restrict attention to a simple Barten-type linear consumption tech-
nology:
z = Aq; (2.4)
where the technology matrix A is a diagonal n by n matrix, with entries that are
between 0.5 and 1. Diagonal elements associated with purely private goods are equal to
1, while entries associated with purely public goods are equal to 0.5. Remark, however,
that purely public goods also imply that qf = qm, which is not imposed here. Goods
that have both a public and a private component are associated with an entry that is
between 0.5 and 1. As discussed by Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006), the above
consumption technology is similar to Becker￿ s (1965) household production model. The
crucial di⁄erence is that the goods purchased at the market serve as inputs to produce
a greater quantity of the same goods via sharing, and thus are not inputs to produce
household goods as in a Beckerian model.
Given all this, we can formulate the couple￿ s optimization programme. This pro-
gramme boils down to the assumption that spouses maximize a weighted sum of utilities
subject to the consumption technology and the household￿ s budget constraint:
max
qf;qm;z
￿(p=x;s)uf(qf) + um (qm) (2.5)
subject to
z = Aq and p0z =x:
The optimization programme results in a set of n household demand functions and two
3See Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007) for collective
consumption models that explicitly account for di⁄erent uses (private, public or both) of the purchased
consumption bundle.
7sets of n private good equivalent demand functions:
z = g(p=x) (2.6)
qf = hf (p=x)
qm = hm (p=x):
Remark that contrary to the household￿ s demand z, private good equivalent consump-
tion qf and qm is generally unobserved.
Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006) also derived a dual representation of the
household￿ s optimization programme. This dual representation boils down to a two-
stage budgeting process. In a ￿rst stage, household members divide the household￿ s
aggregate resources among each other. In the second stage, each individual maximizes
her/his own utility subject to the resulting shares and taking account of personalized
prices. In a collective model with only private consumption, these personalized prices
are equal to observed market prices. In a context with public consumption, this is
no longer the case: personalized prices are a vector of Lindahl prices such that, at
these prices and the individual￿ s fraction of the household￿ s aggregate resources, each
individual is willing to consume her/his vector of private good equivalents.
More precisely, using the results of Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006), it
can be shown that, under the above stated assumptions on individual preferences, the
household￿ s budget constraint and the consumption technology, there exists a Lindahl





and a sharing rule ￿ (p=x;s), constrained between 0 and 1, such that:






qm = hm (p=x) = gm
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￿ (p=x)
1 ￿ ￿ (p=x;s)
￿








1 ￿ ￿ (p=x;s)
￿
:
The Lindahl type vector of personalized prices are normalized such that the household￿ s
aggregate resources are equal to ￿0 ￿
qf + qm￿
= 1, whereas the shares ￿ and (1 ￿ ￿)
of the household￿ s resources that are allocated to the wife and to the husband are
respectively equal to ￿0qf and ￿0qm. Similar to the Pareto weight ￿, the sharing rule
￿ is a measure of the wife￿ s weight in the household￿ s decision making process. Ceteris
paribus, the higher the share ￿, the higher the utility that will be attained by the wife
8by means of a higher private consumption qf. In contrast with the Pareto weight ￿,
the sharing rule ￿ does not depend on the particular cardinalization chosen to represent
individual preferences.
A core question now is whether the above collective model can be identi￿ed given ob-
servable couple￿ s demand functions g(p=x) and widow(er)s￿demand functions gf (p=x)
and gm (p=x). In other words, can we identify the sharing rule ￿ (p=x;s), the consump-
tion technology A, personalized prices ￿ (p=x) and individual private good equiva-
lents hf (p=x) and hm (p=x) given observed demand? Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel
(2006) demonstrated that a su¢ cient condition is implied by the assumption that pref-
erences of individuals do not change when they form a couple. In our application, this
can be rephrased as individual preferences staying the same after becoming a widow(er).
The intuition of the identi￿cation result is as follows. The couples￿demand func-
tions g(p=x) can be easily identi￿ed if one observes ordinary demand data with observed
prices p, total expenditures x and consumption bundles z. Similarly, the above equal
preferences assumption allows us to identify individual demand functions gf (p=x) and
gm (p=x) using ordinary demand data for respectively widows and widowers. It is well-
known in consumer theory that one can identify (up to a monotone increasing transfor-
mation) the widows￿and widowers￿indirect utility functions vf and vm by means of the
identi￿ed individual demand functions gf (p=x) and gm (p=x). Finally, the remaining
components of the collective consumption model A, ￿ (p=x), ￿ (p=x;s), hf (p=x) and
hm (p=x) can be identi￿ed by making use of the identi￿ed individual demand functions
gf (p=x) and gm (p=x) and observable elderly couples￿demand functions g(p=x).
2.3. Welfare-analytical concepts
Once the above collective consumption model is identi￿ed, two useful welfare-analytical
concepts can be derived (see also Lewbel, 2003a, 2003b). A ￿rst concept is a measure
for the economies of scale of living in a couple. Following Browning, Chiappori and






The measure compares the expenditures that would be needed to ￿nance aggregate
private consumption q = qf + qm when both individuals would be living alone rather
than in a couple with the expenditures that are needed to purchase the consumption
bundle z. It is clear that the more sharing inside the household, the higher the economies
of scale will be. Two extreme cases can be distinguished. Firstly, if all consumption
would be purely private, then aggregate private consumption q would be equal to the
observed couple￿ s consumption bundle z (see the consumption technology function in
(2.4)). In that case, the measure for the economies of scale e would be equal to zero and
9would reach its minimum. Secondly, if all consumption would be purely public, then
aggregate private consumption would be equal to two times the couple￿ s consumption
bundle z. In this case, the measure for the economies of scale e would be equal to 1 and
would reach its maximum. It should be stressed that the measure for the economies of
scale assumes that there is no shift in the individual consumption pattern when both
spouses would live alone rather than in a couple. As soon as individuals live alone, they
are confronted with market prices instead of the individual shadow prices. As soon as
both sets of prices do not coincide (as expected), the optimal consumption pattern can
be di⁄erent.
Lewbel (2003a, 2003b) and Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006) suggest so-called
indi⁄erence scales to account for possible shifts in the individual budget allocation. The

















The numerator of these indi⁄erence scales is equal to the minimum expenditures needed
for a female or male individual living alone to reach the same indi⁄erence curve as when
(s)he would live in a couple and obtain a vector of private good equivalents of respec-
tively qf or qm. The denominator is equal to the couple￿ s total expenditures x that
are used to ￿nance household consumption z. Two remarks are in order. Firstly, as
discussed by Lewbel (2003a, 2003b) and Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006), these
indi⁄erence scales do not su⁄er from the well-known de￿ciency of standard equivalence
scales with respect to interpersonal utility comparisons. As is clear from the above
de￿nitions, the utility level of the same individual is compared for two di⁄erent living
arrangements. In other words, the indi⁄erence scales are not a⁄ected by the particu-
lar cardinal representation of the individual preferences and thus do not involve any
interpersonal utility comparisons like standard equivalence scales. Of course, the ap-
plicability of the above concepts still rests on the assumption that preferences do not
change when an individual becomes a widow(er).4 A second remark is that the indi⁄er-
ence scales will not only depend on individual preferences, but also on the consumption
technology and the shares that are allocated to both spouses (see equation (2.8)). If,
say, a change in the distribution factor s is such that the share allocated to the wife
increases, then she will generally need more expenditures when living alone to reach
the same indi⁄erence curve as when she is living in a couple after the change in the
distribution factor.
4Note that, since the model is overidenti￿ed, there are possibilities to model preference changes when
moving between living arrangements (see Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel, 2006).
103. Empirical application
3.1. Empirical speci￿cation
In what follows, we will ￿rst discuss the consumption behaviour (individual preferences
and observed demand) of widows and widowers. Next, we will focus on the assumptions
we make on the consumption technology and the sharing rule applied to elderly cou-
ples. Finally, we will discuss how these assumptions are re￿ ected in observed demand
behaviour of elderly couples.
3.1.1. Individuals￿preferences
We assume that widows and widowers￿preferences can be represented by the indirect
utility function underlying the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) of
Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997). As is well-known, QUAIDS allows ￿ exible price
responses while preserving theoretical consistency. Moreover, given its quadratic income
responses, its Engel curves are able to display a great variety of shapes. The individual
indirect utility function is thus assumed to be of the following form (k = f;m):
vk =
(￿





































ij (8i;j;k) are to be estimated. Following Banks,
Blundell and Lewbel (1997), the parameter ￿k
0 is chosen to be just below the lowest






i = 0, P
i ￿k
i = 0 and
P
i ￿k
ij = 0 8j. Homogeneity is satis￿ed if
P
j ￿k
ij = 0 8i. Slutsky
symmetry is satis￿ed if ￿ij = ￿ji 8i;j. Note that the indirect utility function underlying
Deaton and Muellbauer￿ s (1980) Almost Ideal Demand System corresponds to equation
(3.1) where ￿k
i = 0 for all goods. Applying Roy￿ s identity to equation (3.1), we obtain

























The impact of individual demographic characteristics runs through the coe¢ cients ￿k
i
(8i), although there are also other possibilities. Given the earlier discussion on the
identi￿cation issue, we will assume that preferences of widows and widowers are equal
to the preferences of respectively female and male individuals in elderly couples. As a




ij (8i;j;k) will be the same across both types of
female and male individuals. Of course, real expenditures and prices appearing in the
demand equations will di⁄er between widow(er)s and individuals in couples as will be
illustrated next.
3.1.2. Consumption technology
Let us now turn attention to the structural model components that are associated with
elderly couples. As noticed before, we will assume a Barten-type linear consumption
technology. Therefore, the link between couples￿observed demand of good i (denoted













where Ai is the corresponding diagonal entry in the technology matrix A (see equation
(2.4)). In the empirical application, we will constrain Ai between 0.5 and 1 (which
are the benchmark cases of respectively purely public consumption and purely private







where ai is a parameter to be estimated.
3.1.3. Sharing rule
In the empirical application, we assume that the sharing rule depends on real expendi-
tures, which imposes some structure on the impact of normalized prices on the sharing
rule. Real expenditures are here de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the logarithm of total
expenditures x and the Stone price index
P
i w￿
i lnpi, where w￿
i is the average budget
share of commodity i in the couples￿data. Next, an obvious distribution factor would be
the income share of, say, the female in the household (see, e.g., Browning, Bourguignon,
12Chiappori and Lechene, 1994). However, we do not have this information available in
the data that we use. Given this, we use a dummy variable that indicates whether the
female has a strictly higher schooling level than the male, as this di⁄erence in schooling
levels is potentially correlated with the female￿ s income share. Finally, as is clear from
the discussion following equation (2.8), the sharing rule is bounded between 0 and 1.
Therefore, we opt for the following functional speci￿cation:
￿ =
exp(￿0 + ￿1y + ￿2s)
1 + exp(￿0 + ￿1y + ￿2s)
; (3.5)
where y denotes real expenditures and s represents a dummy variable that indicates
whether the female has a strictly higher schooling level than the male and where ￿i
(i = 0;1;2) are parameters to be estimated.5
3.1.4. Couples￿demand system
Let us now derive the budget share equations for elderly couples. For individual pref-
erences that can be represented by the QUAIDS model and the Barten-type linear
consumption technology, the budget share version of equation (2.8) is of the following































































Interestingly enough, the budget share for commodity i is equal to a weighted average
of individual budget shares, with weights equal to the spouses￿shares in the (appro-
priately de￿ned) household￿ s aggregate resources. Moreover, the higher the share of an
individual, the more the couple￿ s demand will resemble the demand of this individual
when faced with her/his shadow prices and income.
3.2. Estimation strategy
It is clear from equations (2.7), (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6) that the system of budget share
functions is highly nonlinear in the parameters to be estimated. Moreover, preference
5We also experimented with a sharing rule that included a time trend to capture potential changes
in sociological or cultural attitudes with respect to sharing between spouses. Since this did not a⁄ect
the analysis in qualitative or quantitative terms, we opted to restrict to the more parsimonious sharing
rule in what follows.
13parameters of widows and widowers (whose demand behaviour is assumed to be cap-
tured by the QUAIDS model of equation (3.2)) are the same of those of respectively
female and male spouses in elderly couples. Another issue is that total expenditures
may be endogenous. In Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006), the complete system
(without constraining technology parameters) is estimated by means of the Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) and by simultaneously making use of couples and female
and male singles. Because their procedure is very time consuming and resulted in some
convergence di¢ culties, we opted for a less e¢ cient but computationally simple and
consistent estimation strategy.
In the ￿rst step of our estimation strategy, we estimated QUAIDS parameters on
samples of widows and widowers (see equation (3.2)). Note that this involves both
within-equation (homogeneity) and cross-equation restrictions (adding-up and symme-
try). Adding-up is automatically satis￿ed given that budget shares add up to one by
de￿nition. Estimation proceeds by leaving out one of the commodities and estimating




ij = 0 (8i), which basically implies that relative prices are used
in the reduced demand system (that is, observed prices divided by the price of the com-
modity left out). Speci￿cally, the following systems (one for each sex) are estimated
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Homogeneity restricted QUAIDS parameters were obtained by Blundell and Robin￿ s
(1999) iterated linear least squares estimator. As mentioned earlier, total expenditures
are likely to be endogenous. Blundell and Robin (1999) demonstrated that the iterated
linear least squares estimator can be generalized to allow for endogenous regressors by
making use of an augmented regression framework. More speci￿cally, in each equation
of the reduced demand system, an extra regressor is taken up to control for endogenous
total expenditures. This regressor is the estimated residual from a regression of lnxk
on the logarithm of an individual￿ s income, the square of the logarithm of an individ-
ual￿ s income and all exogenous variables in the demand system. Standard errors for
14the homogeneity restricted parameters were obtained by a bootstrap procedure. Fi-
nally, consistent symmetry restricted QUAIDS estimates were obtained by a minimum
distance procedure (see Browning and Meghir, 1991, and Banks, Blundell and Lewbel,
1997). Denote the homogeneity restricted parameters by ￿k and the symmetry restricted
parameters by ￿k (k = f;m). Under the null hypothesis of a symmetric Slutsky matrix
￿k = K￿k, where K is a matrix that imposes ￿k
ij = ￿k
ji (8i;j). Symmetry restricted es-















is the vector of estimated homogeneity restricted parameters and b V￿1 is the inverse
of the variance-covariance matrix of b ￿
k
. An estimate for the variance-covariance matrix





In the second step of our estimation strategy, consumption technology and sharing
rule parameters are obtained by GMM while taking the estimated preference parame-
ters as given. Following Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006), we assume that the
demand system residuals are uncorrelated across elderly couples but correlated across
goods at the household level. Assume that we have to estimate P consumption tech-
nology and sharing rule parameters and that we have R (￿ P) instruments. Denote the
(P ￿ 1)-vector of consumption technology and sharing rule parameters by ’ and the
(R ￿ 1)-vector of instruments for couple h by rh. The observed budget share for com-
modity i of couple h is denoted by wi;h, while the corresponding estimated budget share
is denoted by b wi;h (’). The ((n ￿ 1) ￿ 1)-vector of error terms of couple h is given by
uh = (u1;h;:::;un￿1;h)
0, where ui;h = wi;h ￿ b wi;h (’). Assuming that we have H elderly



















where b uh is couple h￿ s residual obtained by a ￿rst stage GMM with a suboptimal
weighting matrix that equals an (R(n ￿ 1) ￿ R(n ￿ 1)) identity matrix. The GMM-








Standard errors have been computed by using the bootstrap.
153.3. Data
The data we use is a time-series of cross-sections drawn from the Dutch Consumption
Expenditure Survey that is conducted by Statistics Netherlands at an annual basis.
We use data from 1978 to 2004. The sample selection is for widows and widowers
who are aged 65+ and for couples with no one else in the household and where each
individual is aged 65+. None of the individuals in the sample participates in the labour
market. This results in a sample that consists of 1401 widows, 434 widowers and 3020
couples. We focus on a commodity bundle that consists of 6 non-durable goods: (1)
food (including non-alcoholic beverages), (2) vices (alcoholic drinks and tobacco), (3)
housing (including rent for tenants, imputed rent for home owners and maintenance),
(4) clothing (including shoes), (5) transport (without the purchase of vehicles) and
(6) energy (including heating and electricity). We assume that preferences for these
goods are separable from all other goods, although we allow for some non-separabilities
by conditioning on car ownership and home ownership. An important remark in this
respect is that we assume that dummy variables capturing car and home ownership
are exogenous. Clearly, more research (of both a theoretical and empirical nature) to
analyse this issue is needed in the future. Another potential selection issue is that on
being widow(er) or living in a couple. Here we assume that becoming a widow(er)
is an exogenous shock to a household, which does not entail a shift in the survivor￿ s
preferences. Prices are obtained via Statistics Netherlands. Relative prices are de￿ned
with respect to the price associated with energy, which is left out from the reduced
demand system. Remark that we only have intertemporal price variation, which, as the
application will show, is su¢ cient though to estimate the model.
Individual demographic characteristics that a⁄ect preferences are, apart from the
earlier mentioned dummy variables for car and home ownership, the age class, two
dummy variables capturing the individual￿ s education level and four dummy variables
that capture preference heterogeneity across time. (Since we do not have any cross-
section price variation, yearly dummies cannot be included in the model). Instruments
used in the second step of our estimation strategy (GMM estimation of consumption
technology and sharing rule parameters) are a constant, two dummy variables capturing
the education levels of each of the spouses, dummy variables for car and home ownership,
four dummy variables indicating the time period of observation, the logarithm of the
￿ve relative prices, the logarithm of the absolute price of energy, the logarithm of the
couple￿ s real income (de￿ned as the logarithm of nominal income minus the above
described Stone price index) and its square, the products of the real income variable
with respectively the dummies for car and home ownership and the time dummies, and
a dummy that indicates whether the wife has a strictly higher schooling level than the
husband. Some summary statistics are provided in Table A1 of the Appendix.
163.4. Results
Let us ￿rst discuss the estimation results for the QUAIDS parameters for widows and
widowers. For the sake of brevity, we only discuss the expenditure and the uncom-
pensated own price elasticities. (Parameter estimates are given in Tables A2 and A3
of the Appendix). These elasticities are reported in Table 1. They are calculated for
the average expenditures and prices in the widows￿and widowers￿samples. The ta-
ble shows that expenditure elasticities are relatively precisely estimated, while the own
price elasticities are less precise (especially those for widowers). This follows from the
relatively little intertemporal price variation. Food, vices and energy are necessities
for both widows and widowers, while clothing, housing and transport turn out to be
luxuries. Uncompensated own price elasticities are all negative. Interestingly enough,
a chi-squared test could not reject symmetry of the Slutsky matrix for both widows
and widowers at a 5 per cent signi￿cance level: test statistics equal 14.16 and 12.21
respectively, which are lower than the critical value ￿2 (10)=18.31.
Table 1 about here.
Let us now focus attention to the GMM estimation results with respect to sharing
rule and consumption technology parameters in the model for elderly couples. An
overidentifying restrictions test rejects the null hypothesis that moment conditions were
correctly speci￿ed at the 5 per cent signi￿cance level: the test statistic equals 1064.91,
while ￿2 (140)=168.61. However, using the Leamer-Schwarz critical value with a 5 per
cent signi￿cance level and 140 degrees of freedom (degrees of freedom ￿ ln(H)=1121.82)
does not result in a rejection. Given the poor small-sample properties of the GMM
estimator and the rather complex nonlinear model that we estimated, this seems to
suggest that we can be relatively con￿dent in the model.
Table 2 shows the estimated sharing rule parameters and their standard errors. It
demonstrates that, ceteris paribus, higher real expenditures imply a signi￿cantly higher
share for females. This result, which de facto implies a strong rejection of the unitary
model for describing couples￿behaviour, is in line with earlier ￿ndings in the literature
(see Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene, 1994, and Browning, Chiappori
and Lewbel, 2006). Further, all else equal, the share that is shifted to the woman
is higher when she has a higher education level than her husband. This e⁄ect is not
signi￿cant though. To interpret the results, we also calculated the sharing rule for
all couples in the data set. The average share turns out to be equal to 0.49 with a
standard deviation of 0.10, a minimum of 0.21 and a maximum of 0.85. This implies
that the average couple￿ s consumption pattern is equal to about the average of the
respective consumption patterns of wives and husbands when they would be faced with
their own shadow prices and shadow income (see equation (3.6)). Still, there is quite
some heterogeneity across couples with di⁄erent total expenditures.
17Table 2 about here.
The estimation results with respect to the consumption technology are presented in
Table 3. The ￿rst two columns of the table show the consumption technology parameters
ai and their standard errors, while the last two columns show the implied entries of the
diagonal technology matrix Ai and the associated standard errors. First of all, it is clear
that no consumption technology parameter is constrained to either one half or one. It
turns out that food, vices and clothing are close to being purely private goods, while
housing and energy are close to the benchmark of purely public goods. Transport is
somewhere in between. All in all, these are quite intuitive results that comply with our
prior expectations.
A useful device to interpret the couples￿estimation results is the measure for the
economies of scale of living in a couple (see equation (2.9)). We calculated this measure
for all the couples in the sample. The average value for the economies of scale measure
equals 0.32, with a standard deviation of 0.02, a minimum value of 0.27 and a maximum
value of 0.37. Recall that two benchmark cases can be distinguished: a scale equal to
zero would refer to a situation where all consumption is purely private, while a scale
equal to one would be associated with a situation where all consumption is purely
public. Clearly, the model￿ s estimates suggest that a fairly large part of elderly couples￿
consumption has a public nature. This is of course not surprising given the estimated
consumption technology parameters combined with observed budget shares.
Table 3 about here.
4. Economic well-being and poverty among the elderly
In this section we will analyse poverty among elderly people in the Netherlands by
means of the above collective consumption model. Where necessary, we compare the
results with those obtained by a more traditional analysis that is based on the OECD
equivalence scale; this illustrates the impact on key policy indicators of choosing a
di⁄erent approach. As is clear from the above discussion, the di⁄erence between both
approaches will be mainly driven by the collective model allowing for household members
that have di⁄erent preferences, unequal sharing of resources within couples and for
substantial economies of scale of living in a couple.
184.1. Traditional and collective poverty rates
Table 4 shows the evolution of poverty rates for individuals in elderly couples and
widow(er)s.6 Traditional and collective poverty rates are given. The poverty rate in the
traditional approach is calculated in three steps (see, for example, Zaidi et al., 2006).
Firstly, equivalent expenditures were calculated by dividing household expenditures by
the modi￿ed OECD equivalence scale. Since we only focus on widow(er)s and elderly
couples with no one else in the household, household expenditures are either divided
by 1 (single individuals) or by 1.5 (couples). Remark that this modi￿ed OECD scale
complies with an economies of scale measure of 0.33 (see equation (2.9)), which is
actually very close to the average economies of scale measure for the estimated collective
model (which, to recall, equals 0.32). Secondly, the resulting equivalent expenditures of
widows, widowers and individuals in elderly couples were merged to obtain the median
of the equivalent expenditures. Thirdly, an individual is considered to be poor if her/his
equivalent expenditures are lower than 60 per cent of median equivalent expenditures
(within the complete sample).
The crucial di⁄erence between the traditional approach and our collective approach
pertains to the ￿rst step of the poverty rate calculation. Rather than using equivalent
expenditures, the collective approach ￿rst calculates the expenditures on private good
equivalent consumption valued at market prices. As discussed earlier, these expenditures
depend on the economies of scale associated with living in a couple and on the sharing
rule. As such, the expenditures on private good equivalent consumption may di⁄er
across spouses. Note that, by de￿nition, the expenditures on private good equivalents
equal household (equivalent) expenditures for widow(er)s.
Table 4 reveals useful information. It demonstrates that the poverty rate for female
and male individuals in elderly couples and widow(er)s steadily decreased between 1978
and 2004. This is so for both sets of poverty rates. The decrease in poverty among
the elderly is consistent with other sources (see Vrooman, Soede, Dirven and Trimp,
2005). In the last time period (1998-2004), it is even the case that only women in
couples are at risk of poverty on the basis of the collective poverty measure. The
poverty rates in the last time period are lower than the rates usually reported in the
literature. According to Zaidi et al. (2006), the proportion of elderly at risk of poverty
equals about 7 per cent in the Netherlands, while the EU 25 (15) average equals 18
(19) per cent. Note, however, that the (traditional and collective) poverty rates are not
directly comparable to those usually reported: ￿rstly, the median of the (equivalent)
expenditures (on private good equivalents) is constructed on a dataset that only consists
of widow(er)s and elderly couples; secondly, Zaidi et al. (2006) focus on disposable
6We focused on ￿ve time periods where, for each period, ￿ve cross-sections were merged. A focus on
yearly poverty rates would be less robust since for some years there is only a small number of widows
and/or widowers.
19income rather than on expenditures.7 Table 4 further shows that the poverty rates of
women in couples are substantial and much higher than those of men in couples in the
￿rst time periods considered. (Recall that the rates for men and women in couples are
by de￿nition equal to each other in the traditional approach). This remarkable result
can be explained by the fact that an important part of the household￿ s budget is spent
on public consumption and that the sharing rule is more favourable to men for relatively
low real expenditure levels. This implies that elderly men are able to attract a relatively
higher share of private good equivalents, with the obvious consequence that they are less
likely to be labeled as poor (and vice versa for women). However, given the increase in
real expenditures over time, female and male shares are converging to each other. Next,
Table 4 shows that the traditional approach (only) slightly overestimates the poverty
rates among widows and widowers when compared to the collective approach. The
explanation is that, as we have indicated before, the (average) scale economies of living
in a couple according to the (estimated) collective model are slightly below the scale
economies associated with the modi￿ed OECD equivalence scale.
We conclude from our above results that, although traditional and collective poverty
rates are very similar for widows and widowers, they di⁄er rather markedly when applied
to spouses in elderly couples. This is due to the fact that traditional poverty rates
completely ignore the (unequal) intra-household allocation of resources.
4.2. Economic consequences of widow(er)hood
Another important policy issue is that on the economic consequences of becoming a
widow(er). This issue has been widely studied in the literature (see, for example,
Holden, Burkhauser and Feaster, 1988, Weir, Willis and Sevak, 2004, and McGarry
and Schoeni, 2005). In what follows we try to shed some new light on this issue by
using our collective consumption model. A few caveats must be considered before pro-
ceeding with a discussion of the results. Firstly, we focus on material well-being. In
other words, we only look at the material consequences (more speci￿cally the impact
on the expenditures on private good equivalents) of becoming a widow(er) and do not
take into account the emotional impact of this event. As such, statements as better
or worse o⁄ refer to material well-being and do not refer to some bereavement process
after becoming a widow(er). Secondly, the ￿gures we show are based on a time series of
cross-sections. Consequently, we are not able to analyse the impact of widow(er)hood
on an individual-speci￿c basis.
Results are summarized in Table 5. The table shows, for individuals in elderly
couples, average minimum expenditures needed when living alone to reach the same
7See Slesnick (1993), Meyer and Sullivan (2003), Charles et al. (2006) and Hurd and Rohwedder
(2006) for a discussion on whether one should focus on consumption or income to measure individual
well-being.
20indi⁄erence curve as when living in a couple (see the numerator of equation (2.10)).
These expenditures are calculated for the four di⁄erent quartiles of the distribution of
total household expenditures from the couple￿ s subsample. The table further shows the
corresponding average indi⁄erence scales for the same groups of households (see equation
(2.10)). For widows and widowers we only report the observed household expenditures
(the corresponding indi⁄erence scales equal 1 by de￿nition).
Let us ￿rst focus on the average indi⁄erence scales. It is clear from the table that av-
erage indi⁄erence scales strongly depend on total household expenditures (both within
a given time period and across time via increased real expenditures). This is not too
surprising given the (economically and statistically) signi￿cant impact of real total ex-
penditures on the sharing rule. For example, women in couples that are situated in
the ￿rst expenditure quartile need 49 per cent of the couple￿ s expenditure level to be
equally well o⁄ as a widow as when living in a couple. Men in elderly couples situated
in the same quartile need about 81 per cent of the couple￿ s total expenditures. The
pattern is reversed when we consider couples in the fourth expenditure quartile: women
would need on average about 82 per cent of the couple￿ s resources to reach the same
indi⁄erence curve as a widow, while men only would need about 50 per cent. The results
for couples in the second and third expenditure quartiles have an analogous intuition.
Finally, with panel data at hand, we would be able to compare individual indi⁄erence
scales with the actual percentage of the couple￿ s total expenditures that is available for
an individual after becoming a widow(er), which would summarize the material impact
of this event. In our data, however, the observed widows (widowers) belong to di⁄erent
cohorts than the women (men) who are living in couples. Still, it does seem useful
to interpret the results in Table 5 while maintaining the assumption that widow(er)s
are comparable to individuals in couples who are situated in the same expenditure
quartile. For a given expenditure quartile and time period, the material impact of
becoming a widow(er) then corresponds to the di⁄erence between, on the one hand, the
actually observed expenditures of widow(er)s (HEX in Table 5) and, on the other hand,
the minimally required expenditures of individuals in couples to be materially equally
well o⁄ when living as a single (in casu a widow(er)) (MEX in Table 5). Under the
stated comparability assumption, Table 5 suggests that women in the ￿rst and second
expenditure quartiles (on average) are materially better o⁄when living as a widow than
when living in a couple: for each time period, the corresponding HEX ￿gures exceed the
MEX ￿gures. The opposite conclusion holds for women in higher expenditure quartiles,
who thus seem to experience a drop in material well-being after becoming a widow.
Generally, we observe a reverse pattern for men. Interestingly (and evidently), these
results fall in line with our previous ￿ndings suggesting the prevalence of economies
of scale in households, and a sharing rule that is more bene￿cial to women in high
expenditure couples than in low expenditure couples.
215. Conclusion
We applied the collective consumption model of Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006)
to analyse economic well-being and poverty among the elderly. This model is particu-
larly useful in this context because it starts from individual preferences, while accounting
for a consumption technology that captures the economies of scale of living in a couple
and a sharing rule that governs the intra-household allocation of resources. We applied
the model to a time series of consumption expenditure surveys describing the consump-
tion pattern of Dutch elderly households between 1978 and 2004. By combining data
from widow(er)s and couples, we are able to identify individual preferences, the con-
sumption technology and the sharing rule. Our empirical results indicate substantial
economies of scale associated with living in a couple, and a wife￿ s share that is increasing
in the couple￿ s real expenditures.
We have next calculated poverty rates by starting from our estimation results for the
collective consumption model. In contrast to traditional poverty rates, which are based
on equivalent expenditures or incomes, these collective poverty rates explicitly take
into account the unequal intra-household distribution of resources. Collective poverty
rates of widows and widowers turn out to be (only) slightly lower than traditional
ones that are based on the modi￿ed OECD equivalence scale, which re￿ ects that the
economies of scale of living in elderly couples are slightly below those incorporated in the
OECD scale. More importantly, traditional poverty rates seem to heavily underestimate
poverty among women in elderly couples; this is particularly the case for the earlier
time periods of the analysis. At the same time, poverty among men in elderly couples
is severly overestimated by traditional poverty rates. This result can be explained by
the fact that the female￿ s share of the household￿ s resources is increasing in the couple￿ s
real expenditures. In the earlier time periods, the household￿ s resources were rather
unequally divided among spouses, in that men in elderly couples were allocated a higher
share than women. The increase in real expenditures over time induced a more equal
sharing of resources, and thus a relatively lower poverty rate among women in elderly
couples.
Finally, we analysed the economic impact of the death of a spouse. Based on cross-
sectional evidence, our results indicate a rather substantial drop in material well-being
following the husband￿ s death for women in high expenditure couples. On the other
hand, women who are living in low expenditure couples seem to need less than the
actually observed expenditures of widows to be materially equally well o⁄ when living
as a single. The opposite conclusions hold for men. After becoming a widower, high
(low) expenditure men are generally materially better (worse) o⁄ than when living in a
couple. These results (in di⁄erent directions for men and women) can be explained by
the economies of scale of living in a couple, in combination with a sharing rule that is
favourable to women in high expenditure couples.
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25Table 1: Total expenditure and own price elasticities
Widows Exp. elasticity Std. error Price elasticity Std. error
Food 0.42 0.10 -0.62 0.39
Vices 0.92 0.46 -3.03 1.77
Clothing 1.72 0.15 -0.74 0.39
Housing 1.20 0.06 -0.75 0.16
Transport 1.19 0.29 -0.29 0.43
Energy 0.55 0.09 -0.41 0.11
Widowers Exp. elasticity Std. error Price elasticity Std. error
Food 0.80 0.18 -0.30 0.68
Vices 0.35 0.53 -1.02 1.78
Clothing 1.27 0.37 -0.82 1.03
Housing 1.08 0.10 -0.37 0.40
Transport 1.59 0.32 -0.50 0.38
Energy 0.90 0.18 -0.39 0.21
Table 2: Sharing rule parameters
Estimate Std. error
Constant -6.413 2.015
Real expenditures 1.378 0.428
Education difference 0.187 4.176
Table 3: Consumption technology parameters
Estimate (a) Std. error Estimate (A) Std. error
Food 4.539 1.849 0.995 0.013
Vices 1.880 1.694 0.934 0.070
Clothing 3.530 1.593 0.986 0.090
Housing -0.756 0.686 0.660 0.041
Transport -0.155 3.228 0.731 0.158
Energy -1.706 1.084 0.577 0.031
Table 4: Poor individuals
1978-1982 1983-1987 1988-1992 1993-1997 1998-2004
Women in couples
Collective approach 50.98 25.68 17.50 8.22 1.92
Traditional approach 33.22 8.65 5.00 0.86 0.00
Widows
Collective approach 29.21 4.02 1.40 0.82 0.00
Traditional approach 31.18 4.89 1.87 0.82 0.00
Men in couples
Collective approach 8.63 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
Traditional approach 33.22 8.65 5.00 0.86 0.00
Widowers
Collective approach 33.86 15.31 1.23 0.00 0.00
Traditional approach 37.01 16.33 2.47 1.33 0.00
Note: entries in per cent.Table 5: Economic well-being and indifference scales
1978-1982 1983-1987 1988-1992 1993-1997 1998-2004 Average IS
Women in couples
First expenditure quartile MEX 1743.81 2388.40 2755.94 3368.52 4339.18
IS 0.44 0.47 0.49 0.51 0.54 0.49
Second expenditure quartile MEX 2657.13 3834.71 4469.91 5486.04 6748.05
IS 0.53 0.58 0.61 0.64 0.66 0.60
Third expenditure quartile MEX 3638.89 5724.34 6240.64 7359.40 9158.69
IS 0.60 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.69
Fourth expenditure quartile MEX 6197.70 9514.32 10040.68 11486.81 15298.04
IS 0.75 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.88 0.82
Widows
First expenditure quartile HEX 2662.54 3545.61 3859.74 4734.21 5935.90
Second expenditure quartile HEX 3423.21 4569.66 4809.17 6036.00 7376.59
Third expenditure quartile HEX 4278.98 5722.61 5758.32 7138.59 8681.20
Fourth expenditure quartile HEX 6022.82 8161.63 7813.73 10075.30 11366.31
Men in couples
First expenditure quartile MEX 3283.24 4211.88 4429.01 5150.02 6104.67
IS 0.84 0.84 0.80 0.80 0.77 0.81
Second expenditure quartile MEX 3800.03 4778.93 5009.51 5873.44 6817.75
IS 0.76 0.73 0.69 0.69 0.67 0.71
Third expenditure quartile MEX 4145.11 5199.71 5346.27 6213.78 7407.07
IS 0.69 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.63
Fourth expenditure quartile MEX 4537.20 5514.21 5728.90 6611.54 7909.21
IS 0.56 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.47 0.50
Widowers
First expenditure quartile HEX 2366.40 3072.86 3911.31 4250.91 5658.31
Second expenditure quartile HEX 3254.37 4254.16 5078.15 5805.07 7447.57
Third expenditure quartile HEX 4214.78 5339.93 5916.73 7297.47 9130.07
Fourth expenditure quartile HEX 6215.66 8768.66 7845.84 10650.08 12020.17
Note: MEX: minimum expenditures needed when living alone to be as well off as when living in a couple.
IS: indifference scale. HEX: household expenditures. All expenditures are in euro.Table A1: Summary statistics
Couples Widows Widowers
Budget shares Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Food 0.30 0.09 0.24 0.08 0.22 0.08
Vices 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.06
Clothing 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.04
Housing 0.39 0.11 0.47 0.11 0.48 0.11
Transport 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05
Energy 0.12 0.04 0.14 0.05 0.15 0.06
Total expenditures* 11893.14 8287.06 2608.12 8150.28 3206.80
Total income* 24142.30 14830.39 5409.65 17585.18 8284.87
Second. education** 0.46 0.34 0.42
Higher education** 0.18 0.07 0.10
Car owner 0.67 0.20 0.48
Home owner 0.42 0.26 0.28
1978-1982 0.20 0.26 0.28
1983-1987 0.25 0.25 0.21
1988-1992 0.19 0.15 0.17
1993-1997 0.19 0.17 0.17
1998-2004 0.17 0.17 0.17
Prices Mean Range Mean Range Mean Range
Price of food 89.39 39.80 88.47 39.80 88.63 39.80
Price of vices 75.84 77.43 74.18 77.43 74.14 77.43
Price of clothing 99.28 26.03 98.90 26.03 98.64 26.03
Price of housing 69.31 73.51 67.66 73.51 67.74 73.51
Price of transport 77.99 60.17 77.28 60.17 77.85 60.17
Price of energy 80.56 89.52 79.57 89.52 80.01 89.52
* Values in 2004 euro
** Refers to husbands in couplesTable A2: Widow's demand system parameter estimates
Food Vices Clothing Housing Transport Energy
Param. Std. error Param. Std. error Param. Std. error Param. Std. error Param. Std. error Param. Std. error
Constant 67.80 1.04 8.44 0.45 -14.44 0.94 0.81 1.10 -0.93 0.45 -64.20 **
Ageclass -1.20 0.02 -0.16 0.01 -0.45 0.02 1.51 0.03 -0.10 0.01 0.31 **
Second. educ. -0.38 0.05 0.18 0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.36 0.06 1.04 0.02 -0.65 **
Higher educ. 0.36 0.08 0.39 0.04 -0.80 0.07 -0.58 0.11 1.06 0.04 -0.70 **
Car owner -1.05 0.06 0.39 0.03 -1.43 0.06 -0.53 0.09 3.02 0.03 -0.64 **
Home owner 0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.03 -3.05 0.07 3.06 0.09 -0.69 0.02 0.42 **
1983-1987 -1.62 0.09 0.09 0.04 -1.80 0.08 2.36 0.11 -0.12 0.03 0.77 **
1988-1992 -1.71 0.15 0.15 0.07 -1.77 0.13 4.35 0.19 -0.08 0.05 -1.47 **
1993-1997 -2.18 0.24 0.83 0.12 -1.22 0.21 4.67 0.31 -0.37 0.09 -2.61 **
1998-2004 -0.46 0.30 0.77 0.13 0.13 0.26 2.02 0.39 -0.02 0.10 -3.53 **
Real exp. -13.31 0.74 -4.75 0.32 17.88 0.68 16.87 0.70 2.91 0.35 -22.05 **
Real exp. sq. 0.05 0.15 1.00 0.07 -1.93 0.14 -1.55 0.13 -0.50 0.07 2.44 **
Price food 1.04 0.89 -1.75 ** 6.06 ** 1.78 ** -1.12 ** -6.91 **
Price vices -1.75 0.36 -4.13 0.32 3.67 ** 2.16 ** 0.19 ** -0.82 **
Price clothing 6.06 0.58 3.67 0.26 -0.90 0.54 -13.72 ** -0.03 ** 3.55 **
Price housing 1.78 0.66 2.16 0.38 -13.72 0.47 11.39 0.80 -0.97 ** -2.95 **
Price transport -1.12 0.23 0.19 0.11 -0.03 0.18 -0.97 0.21 1.73 0.12 -0.53 **
Price energy -6.02 ** -0.14 ** 4.93 ** -0.65 ** 0.20 ** 1.67 **
Residual 10.74 0.23 1.87 0.09 -7.04 0.21 -5.30 0.30 -0.61 0.08 -0.49 **
* All parameter estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100.
** Parameters obtained by means of theoretical restrictions.Table A3: Widower's demand system parameter estimates
Food Vices Clothing Housing Transport Energy
Param. Std. error Param. Std. error Param. Std. error Param. Std. error Param. Std. error Param. Std. error
Constant 40.72 1.61 22.71 1.28 8.26 0.99 48.79 1.99 -12.45 0.96 -112.91 **
Ageclass -0.40 0.05 -0.76 0.04 -0.54 0.03 0.95 0.06 -0.21 0.03 0.78 **
Second. educ. -2.31 0.11 0.67 0.08 0.94 0.06 1.22 0.12 1.27 0.05 -2.15 **
Higher educ. -2.74 0.18 1.36 0.15 0.28 0.10 3.06 0.24 0.47 0.11 -3.11 **
Car owner -0.61 0.10 -0.82 0.08 -1.45 0.05 -0.46 0.13 4.88 0.06 -1.91 **
Home owner -1.80 0.16 1.11 0.12 -1.27 0.09 4.07 0.20 -2.51 0.09 -0.16 **
1983-1987 -0.60 0.19 0.88 0.13 -0.53 0.09 0.66 0.22 -0.19 0.09 -0.84 **
1988-1992 0.71 0.31 3.30 0.27 0.98 0.18 0.44 0.41 -2.21 0.13 -4.40 **
1993-1997 1.08 0.49 3.52 0.46 1.34 0.30 -2.88 0.66 -0.68 0.20 -4.30 **
1998-2004 1.91 0.60 5.40 0.52 1.26 0.33 -5.16 0.77 0.05 0.24 -5.68 **
Real exp. -8.37 0.98 -8.19 0.74 -0.23 0.64 -7.78 1.04 11.17 0.54 10.01 **
Real exp. sq. 0.83 0.18 0.88 0.14 0.40 0.13 2.50 0.19 -1.49 0.10 -3.76 **
Price food 12.16 1.54 2.10 ** -0.27 ** -7.96 ** -1.38 ** -6.19 **
Price vices 2.10 1.06 -2.23 1.18 6.28 ** -8.63 ** -2.73 ** 2.96 **
Price clothing -0.27 0.79 6.28 0.62 0.73 0.58 -10.84 ** 3.29 ** -1.18 **
Price housing -7.96 1.36 -8.63 1.25 -10.84 0.69 28.89 1.93 2.54 ** -9.22 **
Price transport -1.38 0.49 -2.73 0.42 3.29 0.30 2.54 0.53 1.56 0.29 -5.02 **
Price energy -4.65 ** 5.20 ** 0.80 ** -4.00 ** -3.28 ** 5.92 **
Residual 7.11 0.44 7.84 0.33 -0.75 0.23 -6.69 0.55 -6.04 0.25 -3.01 **
* All parameter estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100.
** Parameters obtained by means of theoretical restrictions.